Commentaries on Aristotle's writings have been produced since the 2nd century AD. This edition contains Greek commentaries on his work from the 3rd to the 8th centuries AD by, among others, Alexander of Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. Philoponus, Simplicius in Greek.

This article analyzes the sex and gender identity rhetoric of members of the Intersex Society of North America, which is a self-help and advocacy group whose main goals are to stop unnecessary genital surgery in ambiguously sexed infants and make medical histories available to adult intersexuals. By examining the organization's indebtedness to feminist and gay/lesbian/transperson theory and practice, the article shows how these political movements have progressively challenged the equation of sex with gender and how intersexuality exemplifies the theoretical and (...) practical problems of identity politics. (shrink)

Examining the language and paradigms of science as rhetorical, that is, arising from the sociocultural forces that shape ideology, reveals androcentric assumptions that tend to thwart democratic public policy as well as effective methodology. This paper applies some recent feminist critiques of the biological sciences to the current research on the possible hormonal and genetic factors contributing to homosexuality, clarifying how this research perpetuates hierarchical binaries and suggesting ways to reconceptualize human sexuality through revised research protocols.

Volunteering, or taking part in unpaid work for the benefit of others, can be a powerful positive experience with returns to both individual well-being and community projects. Volunteering is positively associated with mental health in observational studies with community samples but has not been systematically examined as a potential part of treatment interventions with clinical adolescent samples. In this manuscript, we review the empirical evidence base connecting volunteerism to mental health and well-being, outline potential mechanisms based in the theoretical literature (...) from developmental science, and discuss the existing clinical approaches that support community volunteering as a part of treatment. Drawing on this review, we propose that including volunteering as a component of clinical treatment approaches for adolescent depression can be a powerful intervention for adolescents. (shrink)

Community volunteering is an under-utilized, at least under-researched, strategy to supplement existing treatment for affective disorders. We present findings from a feasibility study incorporating community volunteering into clinical treatment for depression and anxiety among adolescents and young adults. This exploratory pilot study had four aims: to investigate recruitment feasibility; to describe participants’ experiences with volunteering; to explore psychosocial assets by which volunteering might decrease depressive and anxiety symptoms; and to document preliminary changes in mental health outcomes before and after the (...) volunteering intervention. Interviews and surveys were employed with participants newly diagnosed with: mild to moderate depression, mild to moderate anxiety, or adjustment disorder. Recruitment was feasible overall, successes and challenges are discussed. Experiences with volunteering were very positive. Qualitative findings revealed perceived positive effects of volunteering on mood and well-being such as helping with social anxiety and being a positive distraction. Qualitative findings revealed several psychosocial assets that improved related to volunteering. On average, participants reported a 19% decrease in depressive symptoms from the pre-survey to the post-survey. Although more research is warranted, the implication of this study for practicing psychologists treating adolescents and young adults for mild to moderate depression and/or anxiety is that they may wish to consider incorporating community volunteer activities into treatment. Volunteering was a desirable activity for interested participants in treatment for affective disorders. (shrink)

Online medical reference websites are utilized by health care providers to enhance their education and decision making. However, these resources may not adequately reveal pharmaceutical-author interactions and their potential conflicts of interest. This investigation: evaluates the correspondence of two well-utilized CoI databases: the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Open Payments and ProPublica’s Dollars for Docs and quantifies CoIs among authors of a publicly available point of care clinical support website which is used to inform evidence-based medicine decisions. Two data (...) sources were used: the hundred most common drugs and the top fifty causes of death. These topics were entered into a freely available database. The authors were then input into CMSOP and PDD and compensation and number of payments were determined for 2013–2015. The subset of highly compensated authors that also reported “Nothing to disclose” were further examined. There was a high degree of similarity between CMSOP and PDD for compensation and payment number. The amount received was 1.4% higher in CMSOP than in PDD. The articles where the authors had received the greatest compensation were in neurology, oncology, and endocrinology. Two authors reporting “Nothing to disclose” received appreciable and potentially relevant compensation. CMSOP and PDD produced almost identical results. CoIs were common among authors but self-reporting may be an inadequate reporting mechanism. Recommendations are offered for improving the CoI transparency of pharmaceutical-author interactions in point-of-care electronic resources. (shrink)

There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model, (...) together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature. It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations. Key Words: altruism; cognitive empathy ; comparative; emotion; emotional contagion; empathy ; evolution; human; perception-action; perspective taking. (shrink)

Stephanie Mills presented the following as the keynote address at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy in Chicago. Mills addresses the readers of this journal in her role as a bioregional author and social critic. Adopting a narrative style rather than the typical format of the “philosophical essay,” she raises questions that are always and still at the core of our philosophical dialogue: What is nature? How do we humans perceive our relationship with nature? (...) And how may the blind spots of academic philosophy be discerned in traditional approaches to issues such as “nature versus humans,” the wilderness debate, and the possibility and limits of technology? (shrink)

When a liberal-democratic state signs a treaty or wages a war, does its whole polity do those things? In this article, we approach this question via the recent social ontological literature on collective agency. We provide arguments that it does and that it does not. The arguments are presented via three considerations: the polity's control over what the state does; the polity's unity; and the influence of individual polity members. We suggest that the answer to our question differs for different (...) liberal-democratic states and depends on two underlying considerations: the amount of discretion held by the state's officeholders; the extent to which the democratic procedure is deliberative rather than aggregative. (shrink)

This paper investigates agents’ blameworthiness when they are part of a group that does harm. We analyse three factors that affect the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness in these cases: shared intentionality, interpersonal influence, and common knowledge. Each factor involves circumstantial luck. The more each factor is present, the greater is the scope of each agent’s vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents’ contributions to the harm. We then consider an agent’s degree of blameworthiness, as distinct from her scope of blameworthiness. (...) We suggest that an agent mostly controls her degree of blameworthiness—but even here, luck constrains what possible degrees of blameworthiness are open to her. (shrink)

Far from an elite practice reserved for the highly educated, criticism is all around us. We turn to the Yelp reviewers to decide what restaurants are best, to Rotten Tomatoes to guide our movie choices, and to a host of voices on social media for critiques of political candidates, beach resorts, and everything in between. Yet even amid this ever-expanding sea of opinions, professional critics still hold considerable power in guiding how we make aesthetic judgements. Philosophers and lovers of art (...) continue to grapple with questions that have fascinated them for centuries: How should we engage with works of art? What might enhance such encounters? Should some people’s views be privileged? Who should count as a critic? And do critics actually help us appreciate art? In Two Thumbs Up, philosopher Stephanie Ross tackles these questions, revealing the ways that critics influence our decisions, and why that’s a good thing. Starting from David Hume’s conception of ideal critics, Ross refines his position and makes the case that review-based journalistic or consumer reporting criticism proves the best model for helping us find and appreciate quality. She addresses and critiques several other positions and, in the process, she demonstrates how aesthetic and philosophical concerns permeate our lives, choices, and culture. Ultimately, whether we’re searching for the right wine or the best concert, Ross encourages us all to find and follow critics whose taste we share. (shrink)

Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according (...) to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. But the former claim only shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the latter claim is wrong—we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief. (shrink)

On a Humean account, a person's reasons for action are determined by her desires---in the broadest sense of 'desires', that is, noncognitive pro-attitudes. In four essays, I defend this account against several prominent objections. The first essay addresses the concern that the Humean cannot account for rationalizing reasons . The next three essays concern justifying reasons : reasons for action that are more fully normative than those that merely make action intelligible. Instrumental reasons, prudential reasons, and intrinsic reasons are three (...) different sorts of reasons to which an agent can appeal in justifying her action. ;Each essay focuses on a specific attack against the Humean account. In the second essay I argue that the normatively of instrumental reasons is brute ; and that, contrary to the received view, this is compatible with Humeanism. In the third essay I consider prudential reasons and defend the Humean claim that all and only present concerns provide normative reasons for action. In the final essay I address the fundamental question considerations of deliberative relevance: what makes certain desires and considerations relevant to a specific decision-making context, that is, what puts them among a person's present active reasons. ;In addition to defending a broadly Humean account of practical reasons, I am concerned to expand the components of a plausible form of Humeanism. Specifically, I argue that desires alone are not always sufficient to ground an agent's reasons, and that affective states are sometimes also necessary. I call this view "thick Humeanism". In essays one and four especially, I urge that a central place be given to affective states in determining practical reasons. I also invoke recent studies in cognitive psychology to support my claims about the role of the emotions in practical deliberation. (shrink)

A memoir of one womanÆs struggle against breast cancer reveals how she channeled her energy to transform her life, even as she was dying.

This essay considers how Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy, including his philosophical hermeneutics and narrative theory, could be employed to facilitate dialogue and understanding between feminists from different contexts. Authors such as bel hooks and Hélène Cixous frame feminist tenets of liberation from sexual oppression and validation of the body as a source of knowledge. Weaving together Ricoeur’s writing and theories with the work of two feminist scholars, Trinh T. Minh-ha and Grace M. Cho, illuminates the potential Ricoeur’s work has to play (...) a part in feminist discourse. (shrink)

This paper engages with the artistic practice and work of Vanessa Dion Fletcher from my perspective as a non-Indigenous academic and curator. Dion Fletcher and I have worked together over the past several years through discussions about her work, studio visits, and various events. In her art practice, Dion Fletcher uses porcupine quills and menstrual blood to inquire into a range of issues and concepts including Indigenous language revitalization, feminist Indigenous corporeality, Land as pedagogy, decolonization, and neurodiversity. In particular her (...) work confronts the ways that Indigeneity, the queer and gendered body, and disability are rendered expendable. In this paper I engage with Dylan Robinson’s “sovereign sense”: a transcorporeal mode of perception that is affective, land-based, and formed through relations between human and non-humans. Dion Fletcher’s work makes palpable this sense of sovereignty through its unruly and mutating feltness. Further, her work makes visible feminist Indigenous artistic acts of resurgence alongside the frictions at the intersections of settler colonialism and disability. Following Karyn Recollet, I contend that Dion Fletcher’s work activates an Indigenous affective experience of futurity and creative intimacy that in turn imagines disability and Indigeneity as sites through which new pedagogical relations can be formed. (shrink)

Classic statements of research ethics advise against permitting physician-investigators to obtain consent for research participation from patients with whom they have preexisting treatment relationships. Reluctance about “dual-role” consent reflects the view that distinct normative commitments govern physician–patient and investigator–participant relationships, and that blurring the research–care boundary could lead to ethical transgressions. However, several features of contemporary research demand reconsideration of the ethics of dual-role consent. Here, we examine three arguments advanced against dual-role consent: that it creates role conflict for the (...) physician-investigator; that it can compromise the voluntariness of the patient-participant’s consent; and that it promotes therapeutic misconceptions. Although these concerns have merit in some circumstances, they are not dispositive in all cases. Rather, their force—and the ethical acceptability of dual-role consent—varies with features of the particular study. As research participation more closely approximates usual care, it becomes increasingly acceptable, or even preferable, for physicians to seek consent for research from their own patients. It is time for a more nuanced approach to dual-role consent. (shrink)

"For never are the ways of music moved without the greatest political laws being moved."Whitman's "Song of Myself" and Ginsberg's "Howl" both contain the description of a voluntary self-sacrifice, symbolically committed by the poets themselves. In this article, we propose to study these sacrificial representations, and the mechanism underlying them, in the light of René Girard's scapegoat theory, in order to show the function that these sacrifices play in society. The analysis is also based on formal considerations, especially the use (...) these two poets make of the long free verse, also called "verset."1The theme of sacrifice and the identification of the poets with Christ have already been analyzed, but never... (shrink)

In attempting to describe the relationship between reason and faith, Newman repeatedly wrestled with questions concerning the human way of knowing. This article explores Newman’s reflections on the process of “conception” in his theological papers that were unpublished during his lifetime, yet in retrospect can be seen as preparatory steps in his eventual writing of the Grammar of Assent.

Research that is integrated into ongoing clinical activities holds the potential to accelerate the generation of knowledge to improve the health of individuals and populations. Yet integrating research into clinical care presents difficult ethical and regulatory challenges, including how or whether to obtain informed consent. Multiple empirical studies have explored patients' and the public's attitudes toward approaches to consent for pragmatic research. Questions remain, however, about how to use the resulting empirical data in resolving normative and policy debates and what (...) kind of data warrants the most consideration. We recommend prioritizing data about what people consider acceptable with respect to consent for pragmatic research and data about people's informed, rather than initial, preferences on this subject. In addition, we advise caution regarding the weight given to majority viewpoints and identify circumstances when empirical data can be overridden. We argue that empirical data bolster normative arguments that alterations of consent should be the default in pragmatic research; waivers are appropriate only when the pragmatic research would otherwise be impracticable and has sufficiently high social value. (shrink)

Digital phenotyping will potentially enable earlier detection and prediction of mental illness by monitoring human interaction with and through digital devices. Notwithstanding its promises, it is certain that a person’s digital phenotype will at times be at odds with their first-person testimony of their psychological states. In this paper, we argue that there are features of digital phenotyping in the context of psychiatry which have the potential to exacerbate the tendency to dismiss patients’ testimony and treatment preferences, which can be (...) instances of epistemic injustice. We first explain what epistemic injustice is, and why it is argued to be an extensive problem in health and disability settings. We then explain why epistemic injustice is more likely to apply with even greater force in psychiatric contexts, and especially where digital phenotyping may be involved. Finally, we offer some tentative suggestions of how epistemic injustice can be minimised in digital psychiatry. (shrink)

The occurrence of the novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 at the end of 2019 comes along with many challenges. Besides worry for one’s own health and the well-being of the family, all measures applied to limit the spread of the coronavirus affected daily life. School closures, economic shutdown and contact restrictions have led to high levels of stress. The impact on health and families has been widely discussed. However, population-based data are scarce. Here, we have assessed health, quality of (...) life and intrafamilial relations depending on the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a three-step random-route approach, a population-based sample of 2,515 persons was recruited during the second COVID-19 wave in Germany in winter 2020/21. While the majority of participants reported no change in their health status and the relationship with their partner and children, more than half of participants reported a decreased quality of life since the beginning of the pandemic. Female gender, age above 60 years, a low household income, not living with a partner and the experience of childhood adversity were associated with a higher risk for a worsening of health, quality of life and intrafamilial relations. These had already been well-established risk factors ahead of the pandemic. In order to avoid further increase of inequality in our society and more devastating impact of the pandemic on health and intrafamilial relations, low-level support and intervention programs are urgently needed. (shrink)

The comments on the French Revolution by the young Marx and Engels are well-known and have been abundantly discussed. However, what is less known is that they belonged to a generation of German intellectual activists who, in the 1830s and 1840s, constantly used the French Enlightenment as a key reference to assess contemporary German philosophy and political life. This article provides an analysis of the two diverging positions on such questions articulated by two representatives of this generation: Ludwig Börne who (...) elaborated a German version of Jacobinism, and Bruno Bauer, a young Hegelian who promoted a German philosophical revolution whose radicalism and spiritual depth was capable of surpassing that of the French Revolution. Thus, as underlined by Lucien Calvié, the relationship of German intellectuals to the French Revolution during the Vormärz (pre-March) appears as an ambiguous one: just as the fox with the grapes in La Fontaine’s fable, left-wing Germans viewed revolutionary France with a mixture of envy and frustration. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I investigate the recent debate about the unity, or disunity, of science and I show that some of the claims made on both sides are in need of refinement and defense. My first line of criticism concerns the legitimacy of the use of metaphysical considerations in the debate. I emphasize the often ambiguous status of antireductionist arguments and I contend that such arguments are convincing only as 'temporally qualified' arguments, whose validity depends on our state of knowledge, (...) but not as 'generally valid' arguments, that is, valid in virtue of how the world is. I also challenge the general strategy that consists in deriving metaphysical lessons from the failure of reductionism. I propose in particular an argument against Cartwright's metaphysical contention about the world being 'dappled', drawn from her attack against "horizontal" reductionism. The core of my argument is that the very notion of orderliness must be relativized to the capacities and interests of knowers. ;Another line of criticism concerns pluralist attacks against the epistemic integrity of science, which often go hand in hand with its contextualization. Charges against epistemic integrity have been developed in particular by feminist philosophers of science. I focus on one of the most worked-out and influential of these feminist standpoints: Helen Longino's contextual empiricism. I first challenge Longino's claim that cases of gender-biased science cannot be simply discarded as mere cases of "bad science" . Second, I explain why Longino's proposition for suppressing biases is too demanding and why there are serious grounds to be skeptical about its ability to serve its purpose. Finally, I propose a revised version of feminist empiricism that incorporates some of Longino's insight, and I argue for its superiority in terms of relative efficiency toward the fulfillment of the feminist agenda. ;In the concluding part of my dissertation, I investigate the relevance of the unity/disunity debate to the practice of scientists and to the authority conferred to science in our societies today. (shrink)

In a recent and provocative essay, Christopher Bartel attempts to resolve the gamer’s dilemma. The dilemma, formulated by Morgan Luck, goes as follows: there is no principled distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. So, we’ll have to give up either our intuition that virtual murder is morally permissible—seemingly leaving us over-moralizing our gameplay—or our intuition that acts of virtual pedophilia are morally troubling—seemingly leaving us under-moralizing our game play. Bartel’s attempted resolution relies on establishing the following three theses: (1) (...) virtual pedophilia is child pornography, (2) the consumption of child pornography is morally wrong, and (3) virtual murder is not murder. Relying on Michael Rea’s definition of pornography, I argue that we should reject thesis one, but since Bartel’s moral argument in thesis two does not actually rely thesis one that his resolution is not thereby undermined. Still, even if we grant that there are adequate resources internal to Bartel’s account to technically resolve the gamer’s dilemma his reasoning is still unsatisfying. This is so because Bartel follows Neil Levy in arguing that virtual pedophilia is wrong because it harms women. While I grant Levy’s account, I argue that this is the wrong kind of reason to resolve the gamer’s dilemma because it is indirect. What we want is to know what is wrong with virtual child pornography itself. Finally, I suggest alternate moral resources for resolving the gamer’s dilemma that are direct in a way that Bartel’s resources are not. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider a particular amoralist challenge against those who would morally criticize our single-player video play, viz., “come on, it’s only a game!” The amoralist challenge with which I engage gains strength from two facts: the activities to which the amoralist lays claim are only those that do not involve interactions with other rational or sentient creatures, and the amoralist concedes that there may be extrinsic, consequentialist considerations that support legitimate moral criticisms. I argue that the amoralist (...) is mistaken and that there are non-consequentialist resources for morally evaluating our single-player game play. On my view, some video games contain details that anyone who has a proper understanding of and is properly sensitive to features of a shared moral reality will see as having an incorrigible social meaning that targets groups of individuals, e.g., women and minorities. I offer arguments to support the claim that there are such incorrigible social meanings and that they constrain the imaginative world so that challenges like “it’s only a game” lose their credibility. I also argue that our responses to such meanings bear on evaluations of our character, and in light of this fact video game designers have a duty to understand and work against the meanings of such imagery. (shrink)

Cultural history's recent treatments of Sieyès’ political theory have understood his political writings in their convergences with and divergences from Rousseau's political theory. By sketching a thoroughgoing analogy between the ecclesiological arguments in Malebranche's Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la Religion (1688) and the arguments that Sieyès offers on the floor of the National Assembly concerning the nature of representation, I suggest that we should recontextualize Sieyès’ speeches vis-à-vis the broader discourse of the ‘general will,’ which was theological at (...) its root. That is, the arguments Sieyès offers for the sovereignty of the National Assembly, separately and in combination, appear to have been shaped by a malebranchiste ecclesiology that grew out of the particular context of the Jansenist challenge to the Church. This argument has ramifications not just for our understanding of Sieyès and revolutionary political theory but also for what have been called the “religious origins of the French Revolution.” ☆ I am grateful to Bill Sewell, Dale Van Kley, Michael Sonenscher, Chris Brooke, and Sam James, for their careful readings and insightful comments at various stages of this project. More generally, I am thankful for the thoughts of the participants of the Cambridge conference in Political Thought and Intellectual History (March 2010). Finally, I thank the anonymous reviewers of History of European Ideas for their comments. (shrink)

David Estlund has recently asked: how can structural injustice warrant resentment and indignation, given that it cannot fully be traced to culpable conduct? This article answers Estlund’s question. I propose that a social structure is an object that persists through time and is materially constituted by humans in relation. I use accounts of the point of blame to vindicate attitudes of resentment and indignation that target social structures themselves, without necessarily targeting their human constituents.

This paper outlines a new method for identifying folk intuitions to complement armchair intuiting and experimental philosophy, and thereby enrich the philosopher’s toolkit. This new approach—trope analysis—depends not on what people report their intuitions to be but rather on what they have made and engaged with; I propose that tropes in fiction reveal which theories, concepts and ideas we find intuitive, repeatedly and en masse. Imagination plays a dual role in both existing methods and this new approach: it enables us (...) to create the scenarios that elicit our intuitions, and also to mentally represent them. The method I propose allows us to leverage the imagination of the many rather than the few on both counts—scenarios are both created and consumed by the folk themselves. (shrink)

Metaethicists often specify non-naturalism in different ways: some take it to be about identity, while others take it to be about grounding. But few directly address the taxonomical question of what the best way to understand non-naturalism is. That’s the task of this paper. This isn’t a merely terminological question about how to use the term “non-naturalism”, but a substantive philosophical one about what metaphysical ideology we need to capture the pre-theoretical concerns of non-naturalists. I argue that, contrary to popular (...) opinion, non-naturalism is best characterized not in terms of identity or grounding, but in terms of essence. First, I lay out some desiderata for a good characterization of non-naturalism: it should (i) speak to and elucidate the non-naturalist’s core pre-theoretical commitments, (ii) render non-naturalism a substantive, local claim about normativity, and (iii) provide the most general characterization of the view possible (iv) in a way that best fits the spirit of paradigm non-naturalist views. I then argue that identity characterizations fail to satisfy the former two desiderata, while grounding characterizations at best don’t satisfy the latter two. So, I propose a new essence characterization of non-naturalism and argue that it does a better job of satisfying all four desiderata. Moreover, I argue that this essence characterization has important implications for both metaethical and metaphysical theorizing. (shrink)

Owned objects are typically viewed as non-fungible-they cannot be freely interchanged. We report three experiments (total N=312) demonstrating this intuition in preschool-aged children. In Experiment 1, children considered an agent who takes one of two identical objects and leaves the other for a peer. Children viewed this as acceptable when the agent took his own item, but not when he took his peer's item. In Experiment 2, children considered scenarios where one agent took property from another. Children said the victim (...) could take back her own property from the perpetrator, but that she could not take an identical object belonging to the perpetrator. Finally, in Experiment 3A and 3B, children considered scenarios where a teacher could give a child either of two objects to play with-an object that the child had recently played with, or another object that looked the same. Children were more likely to say that the teacher should give the object recently played with when it belonged to the child, compared with when it belonged to the teacher. These findings are informative about the basis of judgments that property is non-fungible, and about young children's representation of ownership rights. They show that children's representation of ownership rights is not limited to principles protecting owners from being deprived. Our findings instead suggest that ownership rights are viewed as pertaining to individual objects. (shrink)